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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT L. VAUGHN and G. JEANIE 
VAUGHN, 
Argument Priority 15 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENT A. HOGGAN and MAPLE OAKS, 
L.C., Case No. 950390-CA 
Defendants. 
MAPLE OAKS, L.C., 
Third-party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(k) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a breach of contract action, in which the Vaughns seek specific performance 
of a contract with Maple Oaks, L.C., and Kent Hoggan, or an award of damages for alleged 
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breaches thereof. The Vaughns, Maple Oaks and Kent Hoggan, entered into a contract on 
March 9, 1994, pursuant to which the Vaughns agreed to dedicate a portion of a lot they 
believed they owned to Bountiful City, to be used as a public street (the subject property is 
referred to as the "Road Right-of-Way"), and to provide additional access to a subdivision 
being developed by Maple Oaks and Hoggan. Maple Oaks paid the Vaughns $5,000 and 
agreed to construct various improvements to the Road Right-of-Way and the Vaughns' 
adjacent lot. Commencing on approximately July 20, 1994, the Vaughns began asserting that 
Maple Oaks and Hoggan had defaulted under the Agreement by failing to perform various 
duties and obligations thereunder. On August 16, 1994, the Vaughns, through their counsel, 
declared that the Agreement was rescinded, due to breach by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, and 
returned the $5,000 the Vaughns had been paid. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Vaughns filed this action on September 15, 1994. R. 1-6. In their Amended 
Complaint, the Vaughns sought an order declaring that the contract was binding and 
enforceable, and granting them specific performance thereof, or, alternatively, an award of 
damages for Defendants' alleged breach. R. 7-21. The Vaughns' Amended Complaint also 
alleged a claim against John Does 1-5 for tortious interference with their contract with the 
Defendants. R. 12-13. The Doe Defendants were never identified by the Vaughns. 
Maple Oaks and Hoggan filed a Counterclaim, alleging that the Vaughns did not own, 
and had never owned, the Road Right-of-Way (which the contract required be dedicated to 
Bountiful City), and sought an award rescinding the contract due to a mutual mistake of fact. 
R. 33-35. Alternatively, Maple Oaks and Hoggan alleged that the Vaughns had breached the 
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contract. R. 35-37. Defendants also filed a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint, 
naming Bountiful City and seeking a decree that the Road Right-of-Way was a public street 
owned by the City. R. 37-38. 
Thereafter, Bountiful City filed a separate quiet title action against the Vaughns, 
Maple Oaks, Hoggan, and others, seeking a decree quieting title to the Road Right-of-Way in 
the City (Davis County Civil No. 94-0700375-QT). R. 344, 369-70. Bountiful City also 
moved to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint, on the grounds that the Third-Party Complaint 
did not assert any claim that Bountiful City was liable for any claim of Plaintiff, and that 
Bountiful had initiated a separate quiet title action, which was a more appropriate forum for 
the resolution of the title issues. R. 344. The Vaughns did not plead any claim against 
Bountiful City in this action. 
C. Disposition Below. 
Maple Oaks and Hoggan moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
contract had been rescinded by the Vaughns prior to the filing of the suit; therefore, the 
Vaughns could not maintain an action for damages or specific performance. R. 60-61. 
Alternatively, Maple Oaks and Hoggan sought summary judgment on the ground that the 
contract should be rescinded due to a mutual mistake of fact as to the Vaughns' ownership of 
the Road Right-of-Way. R. 60-61. 
The Vaughns moved for partial summary judgment against Maple Oaks and Hoggan, 
seeking judgment that there was no "mutually agreed contract rescission," that there was no 
mutual mistake of fact, that there was an enforceable contract, and that the Vaughns owned 
fee simple title to the Road Right-of-Way. R. 255-56. 
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After a hearing, the District Court granted Maple Oaks' and Hoggan's motion for 
summary judgment, on the ground that the contract had been rescinded by the Vaughns on 
August 16, 1994, and the Vaughns could not, therefore, assert claims for specific 
performance or damages based upon the contract. R. 346-50. Based upon the Court's 
granting of the summary judgment motion, and Bountiful City's filing of the quiet title 
action, Maple Oaks and Hoggan moved to dismiss their Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, without prejudice. R. 351-52. The Vaughns then moved to consolidate this 
action with Bountiful City's quiet title action. R. 369-70. The Vaughns also filed a motion 
for summary judgment against Bountiful City (although no claim had been pled by the 
Vaughns against Bountiful City), requesting a determination that the City was estopped to 
claim and/or had waived any claim that the Vaughns did not own the Road Right-of-Way and 
that the Vaughns owned fee simple title to the parcel, subject only to an undedicated right-of-
way in favor of the City. R. 404-06. 
After further proceedings, the District Court entered an order, dated March 29, 1995, 
granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, denying the Vaughns' motion to 
consolidate, denying Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, granting Defendants' motion for 
voluntary dismissal of the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (without prejudice), and 
dismissing the Vaughns' claims against John Does 1-5 (without prejudice). R. 425-27. The 
order disposed of all of the claims of all of the parties. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
For purposes of the Vaughns' appeal, the material and undisputed facts are as 
follows. In 1978, the plat for the Indian Springs Estates Plat "A," was recorded in the 
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Office of the County Recorder of Davis Qounty. R. 64, 132. The Vaughns acquired Lot 8 
of the subdivision in November 1990. R. 64, 73, 132. The Road Right-of-Way lies 
immediately to the north of Lot 8, and is designated on the subdivision plat as "Road Right 
of Way." R. 64, Ex. "A" to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Ex. "A" is not 
paginated in the record). Maple Oaks, L.C., owns the parcel of real estate to the east of the 
Road Right of Way. R. 64, 79. 
On March 9, 1994, the Vaughns and Maple Oaks and Hoggan entered into the 
Agreement. R. 7, 23, 65. The fundamental objective of the Agreement was to grant an 
additional access to Maple Oaks' development across the Road Right-of-Way, which was 
believed to be owned by the Vaughns. R. 15, 65, 79, 132. The Agreement specifically 
recites that the Vaughns owned the parcel that was to be used as the Road Right-of-Way. R. 
15. 
Commencing on approximately July 20, 1994, the Vaughns asserted that Maple Oaks 
and Hoggan breached the Agreement by failing to perform various duties and obligations 
thereunder. R. 65, 80, 132. On or about August 17, 1994, John Clark, a member of Maple 
Oaks, received a copy of a letter from David Cook, counsel for the Vaughns. R. 65-66, 75, 
133. On or about August 30, 1994, Kent Hoggan, also a member of Maple Oaks, received 
the same letter, together with a check from the Vaughns for $5,000. R. 65-66, 75, 84-85, 
133. The letter was dated August 16, 1994. The letter stated: 
Associated Title advises no funds were deposited by you for Vaughns 
by the close of business on August 15, 1994 and further advises Bountiful 
City's bond requirement has not yet been satisfied. 
Vaughns advise you have not met the requirements of the letters to you dated 
July 28, 1994 and August 10, 1994 regarding contract performance. 
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Therefore, at the request of Robert L. and G. Jean Vaughn, herewith is 
the Vaughn's check no. 5026 in the sum of $5,000.00, constituting the return 
of the sum you paid Vaughns pursuant to the referenced Agreement. 
Said Agreement is hereby declared rescinded for breach on your part. 
The Vaughns will proceed with flag lot development. 
By copy of this letter Associated Title Company is requested to return 
to the Vaughns the deed to a portion of Vaughn's Lot 8, Indian Springs Estate, 
Plat A. 
R. 84-85. 
Maple Oaks and Hoggan continued to negotiate with the Vaughns and their counsel in 
hopes of resolving the differences of the parties. R. 66, 75, 134. These discussions 
continued until approximately September 7, 1994. R. 66, 75, 80, 134. No agreement was 
reached. R. 66, 75, 80, 134. At no time during the discussions, or by any other means, did 
the Vaughns or their counsel withdraw their stated rescission of the Agreement as set forth in 
Mr. Cook's letter of August 16. R. 66, 75, 80, 134. 
In their brief, the Vaughns assert that they consented to continued performance under 
the contract by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, and requested that their $5,000 check be returned. 
Vaughns' Brief at pp. 2, 11, and 18. The record does not support those assertions. First, in 
moving for summary judgment, Maple Oaks and Hoggan specifically alleged that after the 
rescission on August 16, 1994, no agreement was reached by the parties and the Vaughns 
had not withdrawn rescission of the Agreement. R. 66. The Vaughns' response did not 
deny the allegations, but asserted that the Defendants had broken off negotiations, refused to 
continue discussions, and, after the suit was filed, commenced construction of a road on the 
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Road Right-of-Way. R. 134. Accordingly, the statement of undisputed facts was deemed 
admitted. Rule 4-501(2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 
Secondly, the Vaughns' citations to the record do not support their present assertions; 
contrariwise, the record is clear that no further agreement was reached, and the Vaughns' 
never retracted the August 16th rescission. For example, David Cook's letter of August 22, 
1994 (which Vaughns now claim asked for a return of the check), was in no fashion a 
retraction of the rescission. R. 292-96. To the contrary, the letter stated that if Maple Oaks 
and Hoggan consented to additional terms, including agreeing to mediate the Vaughns' 
damage claim and pay liquidated damages if work was not done by a specified date, then the 
contract could be reinstated.1 R. 294-96. Mr. Cook's letter stated that the new terms could 
be accepted only be the Defendants' execution of the letter and the return of the Vaughns' 
check. R. 295. There was never any agreement to those terms, the letter was never signed 
by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, and the check was not returned. 
Mr. Cook's letter of September 8, 1994, which recites the sequence of negotiations 
from the Vaughns' perspective, confirms that the Agreement had been rescinded, that no 
subsequent agreement to continue the contract had been reached, and that the Vaughns' offer 
to reinstate the contract (as set forth in Mr. Cook's letter of August 22, 1994) was not 
1
 In pertinent part, Mr. Cook's letter stated: "Based on that representation, 
Vaughns are willing to extend your time for performance of the March 9, 1994 Agreement in 
respect to getting Vaughns a building permit by posting the City request bond to August 31, 
1994, at the close of business if you will agree to the matters below referred to and indicate 
your agreement by signing and returning a copy of this letter." R. 294. 
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accepted. R. 233-46. There was no dispute in the District Court on that issue, and there is 
no present dispute established by the record. 
On September 15, 1994, Mr. Cook telephoned Defendant's counsel, Bryce Panzer, 
advised that the Vaughns were filing a lawsuit, and asked if he was authorized to accept 
service of the complaint on behalf of the Defendants. R. 66, 92, 132. On September 16, 
1994, Mr. Panzer faxed a letter to Mr. Cook, advising Mr. Cook that he could accept 
service, and further stating, inter alia, the following: 
Maple Oaks and Kent Hoggan have also asked me to advise you that 
they agree that the Agreement, dated March 9, 1994, should be rescinded, and 
accept the rescission of Agreement as stated in your letter of August 16, 1994. 
In case your clients have done something else with the funds backing the 
Vaughns' check no. 5026, Maple Oaks will not attempt to cash the check for 
five days from the date of the letter. 
While my clients accept rescission of the Agreement as an appropriate 
resolution for both parties, we certainly disagree with the basis for rescission 
set forth in your letter. As we have discussed from time to time, my clients 
believe that they have not breached the agreement with the Vaughns. 
Our research on the title to the property that was to be conveyed and/or 
dedicated by the Vaughns for use as a Bountiful City road discloses that the 
Vaughns do not have title to the road right of way, nor do we believe they 
even have a colorable claim to title. Accordingly, rescission of the agreement 
is appropriate based upon a mutual mistake of fact and/or failure of 
consideration. 
R. 66-67, 92, 95-96, 132. 
On or about September 22, 1994, the Vaughns' check returning the $5,000 was 
deposited in Maple Oaks' bank account, and the check was paid by the drawee bank. R. 67, 
80, 132. Maple Oaks and Kent Hoggan received no benefits from the Vaughns under the 
Agreement. R. 67, 80, 134. As of the date of the rescission, August 16, 1994, and upon 
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the tender by Vaughns of the $5,000 that had been paid to them, the parties had been 
restored to their respective pre-contract positions. 
On September 16, 1994, the Vaughns commenced this action by filing the Complaint. 
R. 1-6. Paragraph 19 of the Complaint states: 
By reason of Defendants [sic] breach of said Agreement of the parties as set 
forth in paragraph 9 above, and Defendants [sic] failure to remedy said breach 
within any of the times orally promised by and on behalf of Defendants, 
Vaughns have declared said contract rescinded and have returned to 
Defendants said sum of $5,000.00 Defendants paid Vaughns under the terms 
of said Agreement. 
R. 4. The Complaint sought specific performance, damages, or a decree validating the 
Vaughns' rescission of the Agreement. R. 5. 
On September 22, 1994, Maple Oaks commenced construction of a road across the 
Road Right-of-Way. R. 36, 272. The Vaughns filed an Amended Complaint on October 3, 
1994, which dropped the allegation that the contract had been rescinded and the cause of 
action for rescission. R. 7-21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having rescinded the contract, the Vaughns are precluded from asserting a claim for 
specific performance of the Agreement, or for damages from Maple Oaks' and Hoggan's 
alleged breach of the contract. Assuming that the Maple Oaks and Hoggan had breached the 
Agreement, the contractual relationship of the parties terminated on August 16, 1994, when 
the Vaughns elected to rescind and tendered the payment they had received. The 
acquiescence or consent of Maple Oaks and Hoggan was not required in order for Vaughns' 
rescission to be effective, as no new agreement was being substituted for the contract. There 
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was no further agreement reached between the parties, and thus no contract for the District 
Court to enforce. 
The District Court resolved all pending motions and issues before the Court. The 
Vaughns' claim that Maple Oaks and Hoggan were estopped to deny Vaughns' title to the 
Road Right-of-Way was simply irrelevant in light of rescission of the contract. Summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants, and dismissal of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
necessarily constituted denial of Vaughns' motion for partial summary judgment on that 
issue, and on the further issue of whether Maple Oaks and Hoggan were "estopped" from 
"accepting" rescission. 
The District Court's denial of Vaughns' motion to consolidate this action with 
Bountiful City's quiet title action was not an abuse of the Court's discretion; contrariwise, it 
was the most economical method of resolving the disputes between the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HAVING RESCINDED THE AGREEMENT, THE VAUGHNS MAY 
NOT SUE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR DAMAGES 
Having availed themselves of the remedy of rescinding the Agreement, the Vaughns 
are precluded from thereafter seeking to enforce the Agreement or recover damages for 
alleged breaches. The Vaughns confuse different legal theories in their attempt to negate the 
effect of their decision to rescind the Agreement. Maple Oaks and Hoggan do not claim that 
the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, the issues of whether Maple 
Oaks and Hoggan consented to the rescission or are estopped from acquiescing to rescission 
are irrelevant to the question of whether the Vaughns rescinded the Agreement. The 
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undisputed facts establish that the Vaughns rescinded the contract, thus precluding a lawsuit 
for specific performance or damages. 
By David Cook's letter of August 16, and the concomitant delivery of the $5,000 paid 
by Maple Oaks, the Vaughns brought the contractual relationship of the parties to an end. If 
the Vaughns' allegations of breach are correct, nothing further was required of them, or of 
the Defendants, for the Agreement to be rescinded. 
The Vaughns' act of rescission is known as "rescission at law," as distinguished from 
equitable rescission. 
If the plaintiff has adequate substantive grounds for avoiding the transaction, 
his notice to the defendant that he has done so, accompanied by restoration to 
the defendant of benefits received by the plaintiff in the transaction, will itself 
amount to a rescission. This is called rescission at law, meaning rescission 
under the theory of rescission used in law, rather than equity, courts. The 
theory here is that the court has nothing to do with the rescission of the 
transaction; that is accomplished by the plaintiff when he notifies the defendant 
and returns what he received under the transaction. Once the plaintiff has 
rescinded, he is entitled to recover back what he gave under the contract. If 
the defendant does not give it back voluntarily, the plaintiff may sue for it in 
the same way he may sue for any other property in the hands of the defendant, 
for instance, by suing in replevin to recover goods he transferred to defendant 
and which, upon rescission, once again belong to him, or by suing in 
assumpsit for money so transferred. Thus the court in cases of rescission "at 
law" does not effect the rescission and the court's only role is to get back the 
plaintiffs property or its value. 
Dobbs on Remedies. §4.8 (1973). Citing Dobbs, the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
Rescission at law is accomplished without the aid of a court. It is completed 
when, having grounds justifying rescission, one party to a contract notifies the 
other party that he intends to rescind the contract and returns that which he 
received under the contract. The rescinding party may then go into court to 
obtain assistance in recovering his property or value from the other party. On 
the other hand, actions brought asking a court to rescind a contract are actions 
in equity. 
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 n.5 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
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Having availed themselves of the remedy of rescission (and Maple Oaks and Hoggan 
having received no benefits under the Agreement that they were required to restore to the 
Vaughns), the Vaughns are not entitled to another remedy, such as specific performance of 
the contract. 
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an 
action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has 
been a material breach of the contract by the other party. 
Polvglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
The Vaughns claim that the agreement of both parties was required in order for the 
rescission to be effective. The Vaughns confuse accord and satisfaction with the remedy of 
rescission. As set forth in Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1987), and similar cases, a mutual rescission is merely another contract, requiring offer, 
acceptance and a meeting of the minds. Mutual agreement is not required where rescission 
is asserted as a remedy for material breach. 
The Vaughns also assert an estoppel theory, to the effect that they relied to their 
detriment upon promises by Maple Oaks and Hoggan, made after the rescission, that they 
would continue to perform on the Agreement, and that the Defendants should not be 
permitted to thereafter "accept" the Vaughns' rescission of the Agreement. There is no 
dispute that discussions and negotiations took place between August 16 and September 7, 
when discussions ceased; however, there is also no dispute that no agreement was reached. 
At no time during the negotiations did the Vaughns withdraw their rescission of the 
contract. David Cook's letter of August 22, 1994, conditions withdrawal of the rescission on 
terms never agreed to by the Defendants. R. 293-96. Mr. Cook's letter of September 8, 
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1994, which recites the events from the Vaughns' perspective, details the absence of a 
further agreement or reinstatement of the contract. R. 233-46. The Vaughns' Complaint, 
filed after all negotiations had terminated, expressly alleged that the Agreement had been 
rescinded. R. 4. The Vaughns' estoppel theory does not make any sense, either on the facts 
or under the law. The Agreement was terminated when it was rescinded by the Vaughns, 
and later negotiations, which admittedly bore no fruit, neither revived the Agreement nor 
created any new contract between the parties. 
Finally, the Vaughns argue that Maple Oaks and Hoggan are precluded from 
"accepting" the Vaughns' rescission of the Agreement because they proceeded to cut the road 
across the Road Right-of-Way. The road construction commenced on September 22, 1994, 
after this suit had been filed. As no acceptance of the Vaughns' rescission is required in 
order for it to be effective, the argument is immaterial. 
To the extent the Vaughns' argument is a claim that Maple Oaks and Hoggan received 
something under the Agreement that ought to be restored to the Vaughns, the theory is 
simply not supported by the facts. The road construction was not based upon or pursuant to 
any agreement with the Vaughns. The road construction occurred after the contract was 
rescinded, after all negotiations had ceased, after the lawsuit had been filed, and after Maple 
Oaks and Hoggan had advised the Vaughns that they agreed the contract should be rescinded. 
As of the date of rescission, August 16, there is no question that the Defendants had not 
received any benefits under the contract that had to be restored to the Vaughns in order for 
the parties to be restored to their pre-contract positions. After the rescission, the Vaughns 
had all the rights they had before the Agreement was signed to proceed with development of 
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their lot, and Maple Oaks and Hoggan had no claim against the Road Right-of-Way arising 
under the Agreement. 
If anything is obvious in this case, it is that the Vaughns regret having rescinded the 
Agreement. Plaintiffs' remorse, however, does not revive a rescinded agreement.2 
POINT H 
THE DISTRICT COURT RESOLVED ALL PENDING MOTIONS AND ISSUES. 
The Vaughns argue that the trial court erred by not ruling on their motion for partial 
summary judgment. By granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and ordering 
that the Vaughns could not seek enforcement of the contract they rescinded, the Court 
necessarily denied the Vaughns' motion for partial summary judgment. The denial was 
appropriate. 
Vaughns moved for partial summary judgment against Maple Oaks and Hoggan, 
seeking judgment that there was no "mutually agreed contract rescission," that there was no 
mutual mistake of fact, that there was an enforceable contract, and that the Vaughns owned 
fee simple title to the Road Right-of-Way. R. 255-56. The "mutually agreed contract 
rescission" claim was expressly denied by Judge Memmott's determination that the Vaughns 
had rescinded the Agreement. R. 346-49. The mutual mistake of fact theory was mooted by 
the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' rescission. The Court held that there was no enforceable 
contract. R. 346-49. The Court properly refused to rule that the Vaughns owned fee simple 
2
 Should the Court determine that summary judgment was improperly granted to 
Maple Oaks and Hoggan, Defendants retain their claim that the Agreement should be 
rescinded due to mutual mistake of fact, and the alternative claim for damages from 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract. 
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title to the Road Right-of-Way, both because the claim was not pled in the Amended 
Complaint and because no claim had been asserted by the Vaughns against Bountiful City.3 
With the dismissal of the claims against John Does 1-5 (as to which the Vaughns do not 
complain), there were no claims pled by the Vaughns that had not been disposed of by 
specific ruling of the District Court. 
POINT ffl 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
CONSOLIDATE THIS MATTER WITH BOUNTIFUL CITY'S QUIET TITLE SUIT. 
The Vaughns argue that the District Court should have consolidated this action with 
the quiet title lawsuit filed by Bountiful City. The Vaughns' motion to consolidate was filed 
after the District Court had ruled that Maple Oaks' and Hoggan's motion for summary 
judgment would be granted, and after Defendants' moved for voluntary dismissal of their 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. R. 346-49, 351-52, 369-70. Thus, the Vaughns 
were asking the District Court to consolidate a case in which there were no claims remaining 
against any known parties, with a case that had just commenced. 
The District Court is vested with the discretion to decide whether to consolidate suits 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). Slusher v. OspitaL 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989); Raggenbuck v. 
Suhrmann. 325 P.2d 258 (Utah 1958). The Vaughns fail to show that the District Court 
abused its discretion, or that they suffered any prejudice whatsoever from the denial of the 
motion. In fact, the Vaughns probably benefitted from the refusal to consolidate, as they 
3
 There was never any claim by Maple Oaks or Hoggan that they owned the 
Road Right-of-Way, but merely that Bountiful City owned it and that it was a public street. 
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were then free to appeal the rescission of contract issue, which was separate and apart from 
the ownership of the Road Right-of-Way. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 93_ day of August, 1995. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Bryce D./Panzer 
Attorneys tor Defendants 
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